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Victimisation, inspection and workers’ entitlements: lessons not learnt? 
 
 
Abstract 
 
      19th century Factories and Shops inspectors identified employer victimisation  
      of workers who reported non-compliance with entitlements as a key  
      enforcement problem. Initial strategies of the Australian federal industrial  
      relations inspectorate tasked with enforcing awards and agreements in the 20th  
      century were cognisant of this problem, but more recent strategies appear to  
      have ignored it. This paper examines the impact of shifts in strategies used by  
      the federal inspectorate between 1904 and 2006 in conjunction with changed  
      contextual issues to make two points: complaints- based inspection strategies  
      identify complainants, and combined with changed employment practices  
      increase the potential for victimisation.   
 
JEL code: K31; J81; J83; N47; N97 
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Worker entitlements in Australia are enshrined in awards and industrial 
agreements (both individual and collective) as well as in statues, and have been 
enforced by government inspectorates and trade unions on behalf of their 
members. Such enforcement is to check compliance, undertake prosecutions to act 
as deterrents to non- compliance, and recover unpaid or underpaid entitlements. 
An implicit assumption in the industrial relations arena is that the checks and 
balances within the system are adequate, and that employers who evade their 
obligations to employees are rare. However, this assumption is at odds with a 
recent detailed examination of the federal industrial relations system in respect of 
wages and other entitlements (the first of its kind)1 which shows that employer 
non-compliance is extensive. Such employer non-compliance may be an outcome 
                                                 
1  Goodwin & Maconachie, Unpaid entitlement recovery; Maconachie & Goodwin, Recouping 
wage underpayment;  Goodwin & Maconachie,  Employer evasion of worker entitlements; 
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of various factors: resourcing issues within the inspectorate; inspection and 
prosecution strategies imposed on the inspectorates; general economic 
circumstances; legislative drafting problems; judicial attitudes to prosecutions; 
risk-benefit analyses of costs of detection versus cost savings by employers; and 
the ability of employers to silence complaints by employees by intimidation, 
victimisation or retribution.  Most of these factors have been considered in 
relation to inspectorates of various types in Australia and elsewhere. The issue of 
victimisation generally has not, and is the subject of this paper. 
In the late 19th century inspectors operating under the Factories and Shops 
Acts, among the first acts to provide minimum entitlements to workers, 
discovered the threat of employer victimisation thwarted their enforcement 
efforts.   Factories and Shops inspectorates in Queensland, Victoria and New 
South Wales were selected as representative of the experience of others in 
Australia in relation to this matter. Victoria was the first to introduce Factories 
and Shops legislation in Australia and its legislation influenced other 
colonies/states.  New South Wales and Victoria are also representative on the 
basis of population and industry size and their political strength. Queensland, with 
its dependence on primary industries and smaller population, was chosen to 
provide a contrast with the two larger colonies.  
To address the issue of victimisation, both past and present, this paper is 
divided into 3 sections. The first discusses the issue of employer retribution 
identified in the 19th century by the Factories and Shops Acts inspectors as 
impeding the enforcement of minimum standards.  The second section highlights 
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inspection strategies, and shifts in these strategies largely driven by political 
contexts, between 1904 and 2004 in the federal industrial relations jurisdiction. 
This section is internally divided into three broad groups encompassing general 
strategic responses. The third section considers changes in employment practices 
in recent years that impact upon employee voice in the employment relationship 
with outcomes in respect of victimisation.  In considering these issues, the paper 
makes two points. The first is that shifts in inspection strategy away from routine 
visits have increased the identification of complainants to employers, potentially 
increasing the incidence of employer retribution. The second is that changed 
employment practices and environments (growth in precarious employment, 
increase in individual contracts, changes to union rights and density, altered 
termination laws and intense competition) have also increased the potential for 
identification and victimisation of complainants.   
Both qualitative and quantitative research and analysis was undertaken to 
provide the data contained in this paper. Historical research methods have been 
used to analyse a wide range of primary source materials such as Acts of 
Parliament, government reports, reports of official enquiries, parliamentary 
debates, and annual reports of enforcement agencies and government departments. 
Whilst secondary literature has been drawn upon where possible, the paucity of 
research on this topic has resulted in primary sources providing the bulk of the 
data. In respect of the federal Arbitration Inspectorate from the 1970s onward, 
these sources have been supplemented by semi-structured interviews with former 
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arbitration inspectors to clarify operational and cultural aspects within 
inspectorates.  
VICTIMISATION AND THE 19TH CENTURY INSPECTORS 
While the early Factories and Shops Acts inspectors identified numerous 
problems with enforcing the new legislation, including judicial attitudes, poor 
legislative drafting, inadequate penalties, insufficient powers given to the 
inspectorate, employer hostility to and obstruction of the requirements, and 
inadequate record keeping, the central problem to enforcing the minimum 
conditions provided under the Acts lay in obtaining the testimony of victims. This 
was particularly the case for vulnerable women and young workers. This 
remained a constant problem from the original Factories and Shops Act 1886 in 
Victoria through to the 20th century. Initially the Victorian annual reports argued 
that, despite many anonymous complaints being lodged, employers would deny 
the charge and women and junior male employees would not contradict the 
employer’s version of events when questioned. When cases proceeded to court, 
employees would often break down under cross-examination. By 1893 the 
situation had deteriorated further and the annual report, for the first time, stated 
that several girls had been dismissed for providing the court with evidence on 
work practices instituted by their employers. Although the girls were subpoenaed 
as witnesses, they were dismissed because the employers believed that they had 
made the original complaint, even though they had not.2 This employer strategy 
was summed up by Chief Inspector Ord as ‘the man who deliberately breaks the 
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law is only too glad if his employees clearly understand that to demand their legal 
rights means dismissal.’3  
As prosecuted cases received considerable publicity, ‘unless possessed of 
a very clear sense of justice the girls appear to fear nothing so much as being 
stigmatised as informers.’4 Public identification as an informer had dire 
consequences for further employment in the particular industry or area. Faced 
with the same problem, the New South Wales inspectorate adopted the policy that 
if underpayment breaches were rectified, prosecutions would not proceed as ‘such 
a course is preferable to placing employees in the witness-box to convict their 
employer.’5 Likewise, employer retribution in Queensland created such a situation 
that ‘those critics who look to the number of prosecutions as the standard by 
which to judge of the efficacy or otherwise of the application of [the Act’s] 
provisions’ need to consider.6 Adopting an optimistic perspective, Victorian Chief 
Inspector Ord stated that perhaps in the future ‘the force of public opinion will 
enable a girl to proclaim without fear or shame that she took the necessary steps to 
obtain for herself and her fellow workers the protection given them by an Act of 
Parliament.’7 
This optimism did not eventuate as the problem continued unabated in all 
three jurisdictions. A Brisbane inspector commented that, whilst breaches were 
detected, ‘when the employees think that there is going to be a prosecution they 
                                                                                                                                     
2  Victoria, Annual Report 1893, p15. 
3  Victoria, Annual Report 1898, p27. 
4  Victoria, Annual Report 1893, p15. 
5  New South Wales, Annual Report 1899, p12.  
6  Queensland, Annual Report, 1898, p10. 
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inform me that they will have to stick to the employer if they are brought as 
witnesses.’8 During 1915/16 Inspector Treal reported that a considerable amount 
of work involving wage arrears was brought on by employees after they had left 
their employment, and whilst a few instances were a result of vindictiveness on 
the part of the employee, the vast majority were bona fide cases as the complaint 
had been delayed ‘because of the fear of victimisation’ and loss of employment.’ 9 
The argument which best sums up the situation faced by the employees on this 
issue was put forward by the Inspector Duncan. She argued that 
It is unjust to place a woman in such a position that she must 
make an election between telling the whole truth frankly and 
being dismissed from the factory — thus becoming more or less 
marked in the eyes of other employers — or evading the truth in 
order to retain her means of livelihood.10  
 
THE INSPECTORATE AND INSPECTION STRATEGIES 
 1904-1977 
In the federal industrial relations jurisdiction, terms and conditions of employment 
were primarily contained in awards and industrial agreements approved by, and 
registered with, the Australian Industrial Relations Commission or its 
predecessors, until 2006. Although established in 1904, the Australian conciliation 
and arbitration system did not institute a system for monitoring and enforcing 
awards and industrial agreements until 1934, when the first inspectors were 
appointed.11 Consequently, unions provided the only form of enforcement for the 
                                                                                                                                     
7  Victoria, Annual Report 1893, p15. 
8  Queensland, Annual Report 1908/09, p24.  
9  Queensland, Annual Report 1915/16, p44.  
10  New South Wales, Annual Report 1899, p2. 
11  Australia, Parliamentary Debates, 1934, p1200.  
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first 30 years of the conciliation and arbitration system, and continue to play a role 
which is considered later in the paper. 
An agency, the Arbitration Inspectorate, was finally established in 1952. 
Inspectors were required ‘to make inspections, examinations, investigations, and 
enquiries’ including interviewing relevant persons, to determine if the Act and its 
regulations, awards, and determinations were being observed12 as well as 
providing an educative role so employers and employees knew their rights and 
obligations under the Act, awards and determinations. The inspection strategy was 
documented, and consisted of programmed inspections that were not simply 
random inspections of federal awards in respondent establishments. On the 
contrary, inspections were targeted using a variety of techniques to strategically 
allocate limited resources.  
Five general principles underpinned inspections. The first, and arguably 
the most significant, was based on the size variable. Businesses large enough to 
employ industrial relations and payroll specialists were considered less likely to 
breach award provisions and, logically, less likely to require ‘guidance’ in proper 
award compliance. Furthermore, such firms were generally unionised workplaces 
where minor issues were dealt with ‘in-house’ through the shop steward or 
delegate, and being generally more ‘established’ than small businesses were more 
likely to be familiar with regulations. Despite these factors inspectors were 
cautioned against leaving large firms un-inspected for long periods. 
The second principle distinguished metropolitan areas from rural and 
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provincial centres as experiences of earlier state factories and shops’ inspectors 
showed that, on a proportionate basis, metropolitan firms were more likely to 
know and comply with regulations. This was attributed to the activity of State 
inspectorates in metropolitan areas, and the greater presence of union officials. 
The third principle was based on the deterrent effect of an inspector ‘doing the 
rounds’ in a particular area, and the practical objective of attempting to gain 
maximum effect with limited resources. Inspecting a strategic sample of 
workplaces in a particular area, to spread resources across all areas, was the 
preferred approach. The final two principles centred on awards, and again 
recognised the experiences of state inspectorates that showed particular awards 
were more likely to be breached (generally those covering the non-union sectors), 
and that new awards, being unfamiliar, presented a greater likelihood of 
noncompliance. The latter situation was to be dealt with in an educative manner 
whilst a firmer approach was to be adopted in respect of the former.13  
In addition, inspectors were instructed to prioritise their itineraries 
according to the type of visit. Investigation of complaints was given top priority, 
and complaints were handled in the following order: complaints coming through 
the Minister’s office; cases notified as urgent by the State Director; safety matters; 
complaints from industrial organisations; other signed complaints (sorted by 
seriousness of alleged breach); and finally, anonymous or unsigned complaints.14 
With itineraries planned to cover all relevant complaints emanating from the area 
                                                                                                                                     
12  Arbitration Inspectorate Manual, p7 
13  Arbitration Inspectorate Manual, pp8-15. 
14  Arbitration Inspectorate Manual p18. 
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to be inspected, inspectors visited establishments where there was a reasonable 
likelihood of breaches occurring (based on experience relating to type of work 
undertaken and frequency that the award was breached). These included new 
establishments, follow up visits to previously breaching establishments, 
workplaces not previously inspected, and lastly, previously visited establishments 
where no breach had been uncovered.15  
The comprehensiveness of an inspection varied. The inspector was 
expected to examine all aspects relating to hours and wages but was given 
discretion to determine whether all employee records would be checked or just a 
‘spot check’ of vulnerable employees undertaken.16 This decision was usually 
based on the number of employees at the establishment (and therefore the time 
required to check all records in a large workplace). However, if the employer had 
a history of non-compliance or the spot check revealed a breach, the inspector was 
required to check all records. Further, if the employer’s records ‘aroused the 
suspicions’ of an inspector, the guidelines encouraged the interviewing of 
employees to ascertain the correctness of those records. 
Although the concept of routine inspections was central to the inspection 
strategy, by the late 1960s and early 1970s resource restrictions resulted in 
modifications to this strategy. In particular, the high costs associated with remote 
area inspections resulted in inspections concentrating almost solely on capital-city 
metropolitan areas, with limited inspection visits to provincial centres. 
                                                 
15  Arbitration Inspectorate Manual, p17.  
16  Arbitration Inspectorate Manual, pp20-21. 
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Additionally, the ‘sample’ of workplaces inspected became smaller, the areas 
covered reduced (particularly rural inspection tours), and the actual inspections 
became less thorough.17   
From 1973, increased resources and a decentralisation policy under a 
Labor government allowed the early principles to again underpin the inspection 
strategy, and the scope and frequency of rural and regional inspections increased 
to unprecedented levels. In 1974-75 both the number of establishments inspected 
and number of employees covered by inspections had increased by approximately 
60 per cent over the previous year. Inspections were much more detailed in 
respect of award entitlements (records of all employees were checked rather than 
a sample), and re-visits to ensure compliance became more common.18  
Resource constraints towards the end of the Whitlam government period 
affected inspection strategy, with thorough inspections replaced by an ‘audit’ 
approach concentrating on ‘big ticket’ award provisions relating to pay and leave 
entitlements for each employee. Further intensification of resource constraints 
under the Fraser government affected rural and regional Australia most, although 
routine inspection programs in metropolitan areas were also curtailed.  
Programmed inspections became limited to complaints investigation.19 The 
inability to base the inspection strategy on the established principles created 
imbalances on two axes: geographical, with rural and regional Australia virtually 
excluded from coverage; and compliance history, in that unless a workplace 
                                                 
17  Arbitration Inspectorate, Annual Report 1972; interviews, 1996. 
18  Arbitration Inspectorate, Annual Report 1974-75; interviews, 1996. 
19  Arbitration Inspectorate, Annual Report 1975-76, p7; interviews, 1996. 
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generated a complaint it was unlikely to be inspected regardless of its history or 
the award(s) in force. 
1978-1995 
In 1978 the Industrial Relations Bureau (IRB) replaced the Arbitration 
Inspectorate.  A review of inspection strategy during 1978-7920 resulted in the 
virtual elimination of an inspector’s autonomy over what matters to follow up.21 
Additionally, a policy of ‘prior notification’ from July 198022 resulted in 
inspections by appointment or following written or verbal notice being provided 
to an employer. This was argued to introduce ‘common courtesy,’ and increase 
efficiency by ensuring that the required time and wage records and a person with 
proper authority would be present at the time of inspection, as well as verifying 
award respondency.23  
Although prior notification may increase efficiency in terms of resource 
expenditure, experienced inspectors argued that it jeopardised overall enforcement 
effectiveness by warning unscrupulous employers of an impending inspection and 
provided them with the opportunity to ‘cook’ the books or suspend or sack 
underpaid employees.24 This was of particular concern regarding the more 
vulnerable workers such as migrant, young, or casual employees.  Prior 
notification also contradicted the International Labour Organisation (ILO) 
                                                 
20  IRB Annual Report 1978-79. 
21  IRB Operations Manual 1980, ss 3-3-65 and 3-3-72 
22  IRB Operations Manual 1980, s3-3-15. 
23  IRB Annual Report 1978-79, p23; IRB Operations Handbook 1980, s3-3-15. 
24  Interviews 1996 
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Inspection Manual25 which established the parameters necessary to conform with 
ILO Convention 81 (Labour Inspection). Rather than addressing the underlying 
problems that led to the adoption of prior notification, the policy served to further 
reduce inspection strategy effectiveness.  
A further departure in inspection strategy concerned the method of 
inspecting time and wage records. To reduce inspection time, the sampling 
approach was intensified. As a result the numbers of employees whose work 
classification and records were checked, and the periods of time to which those 
records related were all significantly reduced.26 The procedure for handling 
complaints also altered under the IRB. Traditionally a complaint would be 
evaluated initially to determine if it had merit. For example, if a complainant was 
concerned about wage rates and it could be established during discussions that the 
correct rate was being paid, then the complaint would not be lodged. Where it 
appeared that the complainant’s concerns had merit, the complaint would be 
formally lodged and dealt with through a routine inspection. To reduce resources 
consumed by complaints, the new policy required inspectors to ask whether the 
employee had attempted to solve the problem with the employer concerned, either 
directly or through their union. If that had not occurred the IRB ‘encouraged’ the 
complainant to discuss the matter with the employer before lodging a complaint. 
Only when the complaint could not be resolved by the parties, or the complainant 
refused to confront the employer, would the IRB investigate the matter.27  
                                                 
25   ILO Inspection Manual, 1986, pp 61-63. 
26   IRB Annual Report 1978-79, p23. 
27  IRB Annual Report 1981-82, p7. 
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This policy shift undermined a core tenet of minimum labour standards 
enforcement. Overcoming the imbalance of power in the employment relationship 
and the likelihood of employer retribution on employees who ‘rock the boat’ by 
challenging what is misconstrued as managerial prerogative is central to an 
effective enforcement strategy. The factories and shops inspectorates of the late 
19th century showed that the most vulnerable employees were most likely to face 
retribution including harassment, exclusion from overtime, being given the least 
desirable tasks, or the ultimate sanction of being sacked.28 Bennett29 notes similar 
retribution in the 20th century on these issues. It was for these reasons that 
enforcement techniques such as including the complainant’s workplace in a 
routine inspection and protecting the confidentiality of complainants were 
developed, preventing the employer from even knowing that a complaint had been 
made.  
The abolition of the IRB on 1 July 1983 returned enforcement to the 
Arbitration Inspectorate, and restored the traditional inspection strategy and 
inspector autonomy. However, this was relatively short lived. Numerous 
influences (such as the OECD’s Dahrendorf report, the Business Council of 
Australia’s push for decentralisation of the industrial relations system, and the 
National Labour Consultative Committee’s review of institutional inflexibilities in 
the Australian labour market) led to a seminal industrial relations policy shift from 
awards and centralised wage fixation to enterprise level bargaining and agreement 
                                                 
28   NSW, Annual Reports 1897-1900; Victoria, Annual Reports 1886-1900. 
29  Bennett, Labour law 
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making.30  
The subsequent decentralisation of the federal industrial relations system 
had important consequences for enforcement. Under the centralised system 
awards generally remained valid for long periods and variations were relatively 
rare, allowing inspectors to gain a thorough understanding of the main awards and 
clauses most likely to be breached. Furthermore, official wage increases generally 
resulted from well-publicised decisions of the Industrial Relations Commission, 
and awards were varied accordingly. This relative stability came under pressure 
on two fronts as a result of the partial shift to enterprise bargaining in 1988. First, 
wage increases varied in amount and timing across both awards and workplaces. 
Second, the conditions traded off in exchange for wage increases varied between 
workplaces covered by the same award. Inspectors faced a massive increase in the 
number of award variations, many not applying across the whole award. Tracking 
these variations required significantly more resources, reducing the amount that 
could be spent on inspections.  
Employee uncertainty linked to enterprise bargaining led to increased 
levels of complaints, resulting in routine inspections being curtailed to cope. 
Unlike previous practice, investigation of complaints was undertaken on the 
complainant’s records only, not all employees’ records. Over time this practice 
was further refined so that only the actual complaint was checked as opposed to 
                                                 
30  Macklin, Goodwin and Docherty, Workplace Bargaining.   
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the complainant’s full records.31 Such methods no longer concealed the identity of 
an employee making a complaint, or even that a complaint had been made. 
While the use of routine inspections returned once the backlog of 
complaints was reduced, it never assumed prominence again. Though initially 
conducted through workplace inspections, by about 1994 the majority of 
complaint ‘inspections’ were conducted by telephone. This was confirmed in new 
directives32 which removed any reference to the inspection of workplaces and 
concentrated solely on an educative approach. The shift from routine inspections 
to a complaints-based inspection strategy places all the emphasis on employees 
knowing their entitlements and complaining to the inspectorate. However, in 
doing so, employee identity is exposed. 
1996-2006 
In 1997 the Howard government reconstructed the enforcement framework, 
contracting out much of the award and agreement enforcement activities to State 
governments.33 Enforcement responsibilities in Victoria, New South Wales and 
the Territories remained the province of the new Office of Workplace Services 
(OWS), a unit within the Department of Employment and Workplace Relations. 
While outsourcing could have resulted in State inspection strategies being 
implemented in the federal jurisdiction, contracts with the States specify that the 
OWS Policy Guide must be followed in relation to compliance and inquiry 
                                                 
31   Department of Industrial Relations, Annual Reports 1990-91; 1991-92; 1992-93; interviews 
1996. 
32  Australia, Commonwealth Gazette  
33  Lee, Whatever happened to the Arbitration Inspectorate?, pp341-2. 
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services provided.34  The approach to enforcement is reflected in changes to titles: 
those appointed to perform inspectors’ functions are now called Advisors. One 
significant change is that, rather than pursuing claims on behalf of claimants, 
under the OWS Policy claimants must generally take action themselves for unpaid 
or underpaid amounts under $10,000 through the small claims courts.35 The extent 
to which workers affected by employer non-compliance are left to ‘go it alone’ is 
highlighted in the Department of Employment and Workplace Relations Annual 
Report36  which notes that 296 of 299 complaints received were resolved through 
small claims action by workers themselves. Recently a casual employee37 was 
‘taken off the roster’ for enquiring about incorrect pay. Such cases demonstrate 
the inherent difficulties for employees in taking such actions against their 
employers alone. Little wonder workers wait until they have found other 
employment before attempting to claim their entitlements.  
Factors affecting workers’ voice 
In recent years changes to employment practices and environment have had an 
impact on both minimum entitlements enforcement and employees’ perception of 
their ability to make complaints regarding employer non-compliance. Four of 
these significant changes are: growth in precarious employment, increase in 
individual contracts, changes to union rights and density, and altered termination 
laws. These are considered briefly below. 
                                                 
34  Lee, Whatever happened to the Arbitration Inspectorate?, p342. 
35  Office of Workplace Services, OWS Policy Guide, clause 5.3. 
36 Department of Employment and Workplace Relations, Annual Report 2002-2003. 
37  New South Wales Industrial Commission, McNicol and Westco Jeans.  
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‘Precarious or contingent employment’ is an umbrella term that includes a 
wide range of employment relationships (such as part time, casual, temporary, 
outwork and labour hire) and accurate estimates of the workforce size of those 
employed in this manner remain problematic. Quinlan, Mayhew and Bohle38  
noted an overall increase of 43.68 percent in the average proportion of the 
workforce in precarious employment in Australia and fourteen European Union 
countries between 1983 and 1999. Although the increased use of these forms of 
precarious employment has penetrated into the male labour market, females 
remain disproportionately represented. While women constitute a large proportion 
of the precariously employed workforce, young workers are also significantly 
represented. Survey evidence suggests that young workers are unaware of work 
entitlements such as correct wage levels, overtime rates, meal break and the right 
to a pay slip.39  
In considering the enforcement of minimum labour standards, precarious 
employment is an important issue for two main reasons. First, the very nature of 
precarious employment either directly reduces or negates the regulatory protection 
of workers, while in other situations it has an obfuscatory effect. Costello40 found 
that employers used these forms of employment arrangements ‘to reduce, avoid or 
simply evade legislative and award obligations’. One recently revealed 
arrangement involved a labourer being appointed as a company director (and thus 
not an employee of the company) to avoid the union and the enterprise 
                                                 
38  Quinlan, Bohle & Mayhew, The global expansion of precarious employment 
39  Australian Young Christian Workers, Don’t come in today, p2. 
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agreement.41 Sham employment arrangements, specifically designed to disguise 
an employment relationship in an attempt to circumvent entitlements legally due, 
create uncertainty for inspectors, making compliance investigation more complex 
and resource intensive.  
Second, and arguably more important, the growth in precarious 
employment decreases the ability of employees to lodge a complaint whilst in 
employment. Pocock, Buchanan and Campbell42 found that on-call and casual 
employees who voice their concerns on workplace issues are vulnerable to 
employment termination. Lack of voice on workplace issues has also been 
reported in relation to casual and low paid female workers.43  Underhill’s44 
research into labour hire workers showed that a substantial proportion of workers 
believed their jobs were at risk should they raise concerns about working 
conditions or safety at their workplace. Similar issues have recently been raised in 
the media in relation to workers operating under Australia’s temporary business 
visa program. A federal parliamentary enquiry45 into the program raised concerns 
about the ability of migrant workers on 457 visas to make complaints about their 
employer or working conditions without fear of their employment being 
terminated and their being returned to their home country. Even where a person 
genuinely chooses a precarious form of employment, the underlying 
                                                                                                                                     
40  Costello, Sanctions and safety nets, p12. 
41  Hannan, ‘Director’ free to sue business  
42  Pocock, Buchanan and Campbell,  Securing quality employment. 
43  Pocock, Prossser and Bridge, The return of labour-as-commodity?; Elton et al, Women and 
Work Choices, p64; Ellem, More work, less choice, p22 
44  Underhill, The importance of having a say. 
45  Australia, Temporary visas…permanent benefits, pp 129-131. 
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characteristics of precarious employment attach a higher premium to making a 
complaint vis á vis a permanent employee. The growth in precarious or contingent 
employment has the potential to increase the likelihood of non-compliance by 
employers and decrease the ability of employees to complain due to perceptions 
of likely employer retribution. 
In the Australian context the extent of the role historically ascribed to 
unions would be roughly equivalent to that of the official regulatory agency. The 
unions’ power to initiate prosecutions for noncompliance with awards and 
agreements exceeds even their comparative health and safety role (with the 
exception of the mining industry in some states).46 However, this role is 
dependent upon legislative provisions that allow for, inter alia, union right of 
entry to workplaces for inspection purposes, and a right to inspect the records of 
both members and non-members.  In the past union enforcement activity has had a 
significant influence on the inspectorate, allowing the inspectorate to concentrate 
on non-unionised sectors where experience showed a greater likelihood of non-
compliance. As a result of the abandonment of routine inspections for a 
complaints-based approach around 1991, the inspection power of unions became 
even more important. Unfortunately three inter-related issues have reduced 
unions’ ability to carry out this crucial role. First, enterprise or workplace 
bargaining over agreements lasting up to five years is more time and resource 
intensive than making multi-employer awards that could last decades. As unions 
spend more of their limited resources on agreement making their enforcement 
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activities suffer.  
Second, unions can only monitor non-compliance and negotiate on behalf 
of their members if they have access to workplaces and to time and wage records. 
Significant restrictions to union rights to access workplaces have been imposed by 
the Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Act 2005, making it more 
difficult for officials to meet with union members, to discuss workplace issues 
with non-members or to police workplace standards.47 A federal permit to enter 
workplaces, even for occupational health and safety reasons, is required, as is 24 
hours notice to the occupier of the premises. If requiring entry to investigate 
breaches of industrial instruments, the official must also serve an entry notice on 
the employer in a form approved by the Australian Industrial Relations 
Commission, outlining the particulars of the suspected breach. If the breach is 
related to an Australian Workplace Agreement (AWA), a written request from the 
member to the union to investigate the breach must also be provided. Once on the 
premises, the official may inspect and make copies of records relevant to that 
suspected breach.48 The legislative requirements to outline suspected breaches 
clearly identify to employers the workers who have instigated a complaint against 
them, making them potential targets for retribution. Limitations on access to 
records outside of the advised alleged breaches require workers to know their 
entitlements, which survey evidence has shown many do not.49  
                                                                                                                                     
46  Bohle and  Quinlan, Managing OHS in Australia  
47  Elton et al, Women and Work Choices, p64; Ellem, More work, less choice, p22.  
48  Workplace Authority. Union right of entry. 
49  Australian Young Christian Workers, Don’t bother coming in today ; Elton et al, Women and 
Work Choices. 
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Third, union membership has fallen significantly in recent years from 
industry restructuring, changes in employment practices, the effects of the 
business cycle, social attitudes to unions and the effects of management 
practices.50 One management practice, the use of individual contracts, 
increasingly emphasised in the federal IR jurisdiction since 1996 has the potential 
to lead to de-unionisation of an organisation.51  Individual contracts introduce two 
problems for enforcement: they complicate the relationship between the union and 
the union member, and regardless of union membership allow the clear 
identification of a complainant.  Individual contracts in themselves have recently 
been shown to allow victimisation and intimidation of employees, especially 
through the use of threats and duress to force employees to sign an Australian 
Workplace Agreement.52 What actions would result from complaints of non-
compliance with that agreement can only be surmised to include similar 
victimisation and intimidation.  
Recent changes in termination law in the federal jurisdiction have 
implications for permanent as well as precariously employed workers. Employees 
are technically protected from dismissal in circumstances where they have filed a 
complaint against their employer or taken part in proceedings against an employer 
for alleged violations of laws or regulations.53 Such actions are deemed to be for 
prohibited or invalid reasons and workers may take legal action.  However, at 
                                                 
50  Bray et al, Industrial relations 
51  Hearn Mackinnon, Clash of the Titans; Peetz, Brave New Workplace   
52  Australia, Federal Magistrates Court. 
53  Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Act 2005, section 
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approximately $30,000, these are prohibitively expensive for most workers.54 For 
workers employed in precarious forms of employment the likelihood of affording 
such action, or of being in a union which could take action on their behalf, is low. 
Other employees face similar financial constraints, and with union density 
declining many are left to their own devices. Thus for many the protection is more 
illusory than real, providing no deterrent against employee victimisation.  
In addition, under the Work Choices Act the termination of employees for 
‘operational reasons’ excludes unfair dismissal actions. A recent report for the 
Victorian Office of the Workplace Rights Advocate55 has shown a marked change 
in the use of operational reasons for terminating employees, leaving the dismissed 
worker ‘with having to show that an employer’s purported operational reasons 
were a sham or contrivance’. The use of this exclusion arguably makes it easier to 
dismiss workers, including those who have made complaints, if other operational 
reasons can be raised.  
Conclusion 
Early Factories and Shops inspectors identified employer retribution against 
complaining employees as a key issue affecting enforcement. Shifts in inspection 
strategy from routine inspections to complaints-based investigation clearly allow 
the identification of the complaining employee to the employer. It is apparent that 
a strategy relying on a complaint being made to prompt enforcement agency 
activity can affect the prospects of continuing employment of permanent 
                                                 
54   Balnave et al,  Employment Relations, p424. 
55  Forsyth, Freedom to fire, pp 
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employees as well as the most vulnerable groups in the workforce, those in 
precarious employment. However, the nature of precarious employment often 
results in the cost associated with making a complaint being considerably higher 
than for a permanent employee, leaving these workers unemployed in the short 
term and depending on other circumstances (industry and region), may make them 
unemployable in the longer term. The more recent strategy of employees having 
to take action themselves through small claims jurisdictions compounds the issues 
of identification and vulnerability, leaving this option really only open to workers 
who have sought other employment. Combined with an emphasis on individual 
contracts, lower union density rates and reduced union right of entry powers, 
complaints-based inspection practices make workers who question their 
entitlements more vulnerable to retribution and victimisation.  
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